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Abstract
As is well known, many classes of markets have efficient equilibria, but this depends on agents
being non-strategic, i.e. that they declare their true demands when offered goods at particular
prices, or in other words, that they are price-takers. An important question is how much the
equilibria degrade in the face of strategic behavior, i.e. what is the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of
the market viewed as a mechanism?
Often, PoA bounds are modest constants such as 4
3
or 2. Nonetheless, in practice a guarantee
that no more than 25% or 50% of the economic value is lost may be unappealing. This paper
asks whether significantly better bounds are possible under plausible assumptions. In particular,
we look at how these worst case guarantees improve in the following large settings.
• Large Walrasian auctions: These are auctions with many copies of each item and many
agents. We show that the PoA tends to 1 as the market size increases, under suitable
conditions, mainly that there is some uncertainty about the numbers of copies of each
good and demands obey the gross substitutes condition. We also note that some such
assumption is unavoidable.
• Large Fisher markets: Fisher markets are a class of economies that has received consid-
erable attention in the computer science literature. A large market is one in which at
equilibrium, each buyer makes only a small fraction of the total purchases; the smaller
the fraction, the larger the market. Here the main condition is that demands are based
on homogeneous monotone utility functions that satisfy the gross substitutes condition.
Again, the PoA tends to 1 as the market size increases.
Furthermore, in each setting, we quantify the tradeoff between market size and the PoA.
1 Introduction
When is there no gain to participants in a game from strategizing? One answer applies when players
in a game have no prior knowledge; then a game that is strategy proof ensures that truthful actions
are a best choice for each player. However, in many settings there is no strategy proof mechanism.
Also, even if there is a strategy proof mechanism, with knowledge in hand, other equilibria are
possible, for example, the “bullying” Nash Equilibrium as illustrated by the following example:
there is one item for sale using a second price auction, the low-value bidder bids an amount at
least equal to the value of the high-value bidder, who bids zero; the resulting equilibrium achieves
arbitrarily small social welfare compared to the optimal outcome.
To make the notion of gain meaningful one needs to specify what the game or mechanism is
seeking to optimize. Social welfare and revenue are common targets. For the above example, the
social welfare achieved in the bullying equilibria can be arbitrarily far from the optimum. However,
for many classes of games, over the past fifteen years, bounds on the gains from strategizing, a.k.a.
the Price of Anarchy (PoA), have been obtained, with much progress coming thanks to the invention
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of the smoothness methodology [1, 2, 3, 4]; many of the resulting bounds have been shown to be
tight. Often these bounds are modest constants, such as 43 [5] or 2 [6], etc., but rarely are there
provably no losses from strategizing, i.e. a PoA of 1.
This paper investigates when bounds close to 1 might be possible. In particular, we study both
large Walrasian auctions and large Fisher markets viewed as mechanisms.
Walrasian Auctions Walrasian Auctions are used in settings where there are goods for sale
and agents, called bidders, who want to buy these goods. Each agent has varying preferences for
different subsets of the goods, preferences that are represented by valuation functions. The goal
of the auction is to identify equilibrium prices; these are prices at which all the goods sell, and
each bidder receives a favorite (utility maximizing) collection of goods, where each bidder’s utility
is quasi-linear: the difference of its valuation for the goods and their cost at the given prices. Such
prices, along with an associated allocation of goods, are said to form a Walrasian equilibrium.
Walrasian equilibria for indivisible goods are known to exist when each bidder’s demand satisfies
the gross substitutes property [7], but this is the only substantial class of settings in which they
are known to exist.
[8] analyzed the PoA of the games induced by Walrasian mechanisms, i.e. the prices were
computed by a method, such as an English or Dutch auction, that yields equilibrium prices when
these exist. Note that the mechanism can be applied even when Walrasian equilibria do not exist,
though the resulting outcome will not be a Walrasian equilibrium. But even when Walrasian
equilibria exist, because bidders may strategize, in general the outcome will be a Nash equilibrium
rather than a Walrasian one. Among other results, Babaioff et al. showed an upper bound of 4 on
the PoA for any Walrasian mechanism when the bids and valuations satisfied the gross substitutes
property and overbidding was not allowed.1 In addition, they obtained lower bounds on the PoA
that were greater than 1, even when overbidding was not allowed, which excludes bullying equilibria;
e.g. the English auction has a PoA of at least 2.
Babaioff et al. also noted that the prices computed by double auctions, widely used in financial
settings, are essentially computing a price that clears the market and maximizes trade; one example
they mention is the computation of the opening prices on the New York Stock Exchange, and
another is the adjustment of prices of copper and gold in the London market.
By a large auction, we intend an auction in which there are many copies of each good, and in
addition the demand set of each bidder is small. The intuition is that then each bidder will have a
small influence and hence strategic behavior will have only a small effect on outcomes. In fact, this
need not be so. For example, the bullying equilibrium persists: it suffices to increase the numbers
of items and bidders for each type to n, and have the buyers of each type follow the same strategy
as before.
What allows this bullying behavior to be effective is the precise match between the number of
items and the number of low-value bidders. The need for this exact match also arises in the lower-
bound examples in [8] (as with the bullying equilibrium, it suffices to pump up the examples by a
factor of n). To remove these equilibria that demonstrate PoA values larger than 1, it suffices to in-
troduce some uncertainty regarding the numbers of items and/or bidders. Indeed, in a large setting
it would seem unlikely that such numbers would be known precisely. We will create this uncertainty
by using distributions to determine the number of copies of each good. This technique originates
with [9]. In contrast, prior work on non-large markets eliminated the potentially unbounded PoA
of the bullying equilibrium by assuming bounds on the possible overbidding [10, 11, 12, 3].
Our main result on large Walrasian auctions is that the PoA of the Walrasian mechanism tends
1They also proved a version of this bound which was parameterized w.r.t. the amount of overbidding.
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to 1 as the market size grows. This result assumes that expected valuations are bounded regardless
of the size of the market. We specify this more precisely when we state our results in Section 3. This
bound applies to both Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria; as it is proved by means of a smoothness
argument, it extends to mixed Nash and coarse correlated equilibria, and outcomes of no-regret
learning.
Fisher Markets A Fisher market is a special case of an exchange economy in which the agents
are either buyers or sellers. Each buyer is endowed with money but has utility only for non-
money goods; each seller is endowed with non-money goods, WLOG with a single distinct good,
and has utility only for money. Fisher markets capture settings in which buyers want to spend
all their money. In particular, they generalize the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
(CEEI) [13, 14], in that they allow buyers to have non-equal incomes. While at first sight this
might appear rather limiting, we note that much real-world budgeting in large organizations treats
budgets as money to be spent in full, with the consequence that unspent money often has no utility
to those making the spending decisions. The budgets in GoogleAds and other online platforms can
also be viewed as money that is intended to be spent in full.
We consider the outcomes when buyers bid strategically in terms of how they declare their utility
functions. We show that the PoA tends to 1 as the setting size increases. The only assumptions we
need are some limitations on the buyers’ utility functions: they need to satisfy the gross substitutes
property and to be monotone and homogeneous of degree 1.
This result is also obtained via a smoothness-type bound and hence extends to bidders playing
no-regret strategies, assuming that the ensuing prices are always bounded away from zero. We
ensure this by imposing reserve prices, but for lack of space this result is deferred to the full version
of the paper.
Roadmap In Section 2 we provide the necessary definitions and background, in Section 3 we
state our results, which are then shown in Sections 4 and 5, covering large auctions and large
Fisher markets respectively.
1.1 Related Work
The results on auctions generalize earlier work of [9] who showed analogous results for auctions
of multiple copies of a single good. In contrast, we consider auctions in which there are multiple
goods. Swinkels analyzed discriminatory and non-discriminatory mechanisms. For the latter, he
showed that any mechanism that used a combination of the k-th and (k + 1)-st prices when there
were k copies of the good on sale achieved a PoA that tended to 1 with the auction size2. Our
result also weakens some of the assumptions in Swinkels work.
The second closely related work on auctions is due to [4]. They also analyze several large
settings. Among other results, they analyze auctions in which the PoA tends to 1 as their size
grows to ∞. Their results are derived from a new type of smoothness argument. Depending on
the result, they require either uncertainty in the number of goods or the number of bidders. In
contrast, our main result uses a previously known smoothness technique plus uncertainty in the
number of goods. We contrast the techniques in more detail after we present our result in Section 4.
They also show that for traffic routing problems, the PoA of the atomic case tends to that of the
non-atomic case as the number of units of traffic grows to ∞.
2Swinkels did not use the then recently formulated PoA terminology to state his result.
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The idea of uncertainty in the number of agents or items first arose in the Economics literature.
[15] used it in the context of voting games, and [9] in the context of auctions. Later, uncertainty
in the number of agents was used with the Strategy Proof in the Large concept [16].
[17] considered the effects of non-unique demands on the social welfare, assuming allocations
were based on demands. Given a genericity assumption, they showed that in markets with buyers
having matroid based valuations the inefficiency was proportional to the number of distinct goods,
and so if this was a constant, the efficiency would tend to 1 as the market size grows.
The study of the behavior of large exchange economies was first considered by [18], which they
modeled as a replica economy, the n-fold duplication of a base economy, showing that individual
utility gains from strategizing tend to zero as the economy grows. Subsequently, [19] showed
that with some regularity assumptions, the equilibrium allocations converge to the competitive
equilibrium. In contrast, our result proves bounds in terms of a parameter characterizing the size
of the economy. More recently, [20] studied the efficiency of exchange economies in the presence
of strategic agents; however, their notion of efficiency was weaker than the PoA. They termed an
outcome µ-efficient if there was no way of improving everyone’s outcome in terms of utility by
an additive factor of µ, and showed that with high probability (i.e. 1 − µ) a µ-efficient outcome
would occur when the size of the economy was large enough, so long as each agent was small,
agents were truthful with non-zero probability, and some additional more technical conditions. In
contrast, the PoA considers the ratio between the social welfare at the competitive equilibrium and
the achieved social welfare, namely a ratio of the sum of everyone’s outcomes. [16] showed that the
Strategy Proof in the Large methodology could be applied to exchange economies for agents that
are limited to having a finite type space, independent of the size of the economy; in contrast, our
results do not require a restriction of this sort. Finally, we note that our bounds apply to classes
of Fisher markets, whereas the earlier literature applies to classes of exchange economies, which is
a significantly more general setting; nonetheless, there are settings our work handles which are not
covered by these prior works.3
[21] analyzed the PoA of strategizing in Fisher markets. The PoA compared the social welfare
of the worst resulting Nash Equilibrium to the optimal, i.e. welfare maximizing assignment, under
a suitable normalization of utilities. Among other results, they showed lower bounds of Ω(
√
n) on
the PoA when there are n buyers with linear utilities. However, we view the comparison point of an
optimal assignment to be too demanding in this setting, as it may not be an assignment that could
arise based on a pricing of the goods. In our results we will be comparing the strategic outcomes
to those that occur under truthful bidding. Another approach is to bound the gains to individual
agents, called the incentive ratio; [22, 23] showed these values were bounded by small constants in
Fisher market settings.
There has been much other work on large settings and their behavior. We mention only a
sampling. [24] studied the notion of extensive robustness for large games, and [25] investigated
large repeated games using the notion of compressed equilibria. [26] studied repeated games and
the use of differential privacy as a measure of largeness. In a different direction, [27] investigated
fault tolerance in large games for λ-continuous and anonymous games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions for Large Walrasian Auctions
Definition 2.1. An auction A comprises a set of N bidders B1, B2, . . . , BN , and a set of m goods
G, with nj copies of good j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. We write n = (n1, n2, ..., nm), where nj denotes the
3For example, buyers with linear utility functions but an infinite bidding space.
4
number of copies of good j, and we call it the multiplicity vector. We also write n = (nj, n−j),
where n−j is the vector denoting the number of copies of goods other than good j. We refer to an
instance of a good as an item. For an allocation xi to bidder i, which is a subset of the available
goods, we write xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xim) where xij denotes the number of copies of good j in allocation
xi. There is a set of prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm), one per good; we also write p = (pj, p−j). Each
bidder i has a valuation function vi : X → R+, where X is the set of possible assignments, and a
quasi-linear utility function ui(xi) = vi(xi)− xi · p.
A Walrasian equilibrium is a collection of prices p and an allocation xi to each bidder i such that
(i) the goods are fully allocated but not over-allocated, i.e. for all j,
∑
i xij ≤ nj, and
∑
i xij = nj
if pj > 0, and (ii) each bidder receives a utility maximizing allocation at prices p, i.e. ui(xi) =
vi(xi)− xi · p = maxxi [vi(xi)− xi · p].
In a Walrasian mechanism for auction A each bidder declares a bid function bi : X → R+. We
write b = (b1, b2, . . . , bN ) and b = (bi, b−i). The mechanism computes prices and allocations as if
the bids were the valuations.
Given the bidders and their bids, p(n;b) denotes the prices produced by the Walrasian mech-
anism at hand when there are n copies of the goods and b is the bidding profile. Also, pj(n;b)
denotes the price of good j and p(n;b) = (pj(n;b), p−j(n;b)). Finally, we let both xi(n;b) and
xi(n; bi, b−i) denote the allocation to bidder i provided by the mechanism.
Definition 2.2. A valuation or bid function satisfies the gross substitutes property if increasing the
price for one good only increases the demand for other goods. Formally, for each utility maximizing
allocation x at prices p = (pj, p−j), at prices (qj, p−j) such that qj > pj, there is a utility maximizing
allocation y with y−j  x−j (i.e. yk ≥ xk for k 6= j). This definition applies to the Fisher market
setting also.
In the auctions we consider the number n of copies of each good is determined by a distribution
F (n). In order for the auction to be large, we need that the probability that there are exactly rj
copies of the j-th item be small, for every rj and for every j.
Definition 2.3. A large Walrasian auction is characterized by a distribution F (n), a demand
bound k, and a largeness measure L. It satisfies the following two properties.
i. The demand of every bidder is for at most k items. Formally, if allocated a set of more than
k items, the bidder will obtain equal utility with a subset of size k.
ii. The probability that there are exactly c copies of good j, for any c and any j is bounded by
1/L. Formally, Let F (nj , j|n−j) denote the probability that there are exactly nj copies of good
j when given n−j copies of other goods; then maxj maxnj ,n−j F (nj , j|n−j) ≤ 1/L.
Note this definition implies that the expected number of copies of each good is at least L2 and
it is in this sense that the market is large.
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is an outcome with no expected gain from an individual deviation:
∀b′i : En,v−i,b−i [ui(xi(n; bi, b−i), p((bi, b−i))] ≥ En,v−i,b−i
[
ui(xi(n; b
′
i, b−i), p((b
′
i, b−i))
]
.
The social welfare SW(x) of an allocation x is the sum of the individual valuations: SW(x) =∑
i vi(xi). We also write SW(OPT) for the (expected) optimal social welfare, the maximum (ex-
pected) achievable social welfare, and SW(NE) for the smallest (expected) social welfare achievable
at a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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Finally, the Price of Anarchy is the worst case ratio of SW(OPT) to SW(NE) over all instances
in the class of games at hand, namely auctions AN of N buyers:
PoA = max
AN
SW(OPT)
SW(NE)
.
2.2 Definitions for Large Fisher Markets
Definition 2.4. A Fisher market4 has m divisible goods and N agents, called buyers. There is
a fixed endogenous supply of each good (which WLOG is chosen to be 1 unit). Agent i has a
fixed endowment of ei units of money. Each agent has a utility function, with the characteristic
that the agent has no desire for its money, i.e. each agent seeks to spend all its money on goods.
Suppose we assign a price pj to each good j, then a (possibly non-unique) demand of agent i is
a bundle of goods (xi1, xi2, . . . , xim) that maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint:∑
j pjxij ≤ ei. A market demand x{j} for a good j is the total (possibly non-unique) demand for
that good; x{j} =
∑
i xij. This is viewed as a function of the price vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm).
Prices p form a Walrasian equilibrium, or equilibrium for short, if the resulting markets can clear,
that is there exists a market demand at these prices such that for all j, x{j} = 1 if pj > 0.
The Fisher market is actually a special case of an Exchange economy. (To see this, view the
money as another good, and the supply of the goods as being initially owned by another agent,
who desires only money.)
In general computing equilibria is computationally hard even for Fisher markets [28, 29]. One
feasible class is the class of Eisenberg-Gale markets, markets for which the equilibrium computation
becomes the solution to a convex program. This class was named in [30]; the program was previously
identified in [31].
Definition 2.5. Eisenberg-Gale markets are those economies for which the equilibria are exactly
the solutions to the following convex program, called the Eisenberg-Gale convex program:
max
x
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · xim)) (2.1)
s.t. ∀j :
∑
i
xij ≤ 1 and ∀i, j : xij ≥ 0.
In a Fisher market game, each buyer declares a bid function bi; however, her endowment is public
knowledge. The mechanism computes prices and allocations as if the bids were the valuations. The
same restrictions will apply to the bid functions and the utilities. The goal of each buyer is to
maximize her utility.
Notational remark The demands are induced by the bids, thus we could write ui(xi(bi, b−i)), but
for brevity we will write this as ui(bi, b−i) instead. Also, it will be convenient to write vi for the
truthful bid of ui, yielding the notation ui(vi, v−i).
Definition 2.6. The largeness L of a Fisher market is defined to be the ratio L =
∑
i ei
maxi ei
.
It is natural to measure the efficiency of outcomes in the Fisher market game using the objec-
tive function (2.1), or rather its exponentiated form. More specifically, we compare the geometric
means of the buyer’s utilities weighted by their budgets at the worst Nash Equilibrium (with bids b)
4In much of the Computer Science literature the term market has been used to mean what is called an economy
in the economics literature.
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and at the market equilibrium (with bids v), and namely we call it Geometric Price of Anar-
chy(GPoA):
GPoA(M) = max
NE with bids b
(∏
i
(ui(vi, v−i)
ui(bi, b−i)
)ei) 1∑i ei
.
Note that in the settings we consider the prices at a market equilibrium are unique. We will
also use this product to upper bound a Price of Anarchy notion for a market M , which compares
the sum of the utilities at the worst Nash Equilibrium to the sum at the market equilibrium.
PoA(M) = max
NE with bids b
∑
i ui(vi, v−i)∑
i ui(bi, b−i)
.
For the latter measure to be meaningful, we need to use a common scale for the different buyers’
utilities. To this end, we define consistent scaling.
Definition 2.7. The bidders’ utilities are consistently scaled if there is a parameter t > 0 such that
for every bidder i, ui(vi, v−i) = tei.
5 That is, bidder i’s utility function is scaled to give it utility
tei at the market equilibrium, where ei is its budget.
Finally, we will be considering utility functions that are monotone, homogeneous of degree one
(defined below), continuous, concave, and that induce demands that satisfy the gross substitutes
condition (see Definition 2.2).
Definition 2.8. Utility function u(x) is homogeneous of degree 1 if for every α > 0, u(αx) =
α · u(x).
Fact 2.1. The utility functions in Eisenberg Gale programs are assumed to be homogeneous of
degree 1, continuous and concave.
2.3 Regret Minimization
In a regret minimization setting, a single player is playing a repeated game. At each round, the
player can choose to play one of K strategies, which are the same from round to round. The
outcome of the round is a payoff in the range [−χ, χ].
Definition 2.9. An algorithm that chooses the strategy to play is regret minimizing if the outcome
of the algorithm, in expectation, is almost as good as the outcome from always playing a single
strategy regardless of any one else’s actions. Formally, there is a function Φ(|K|, T ) = o(T ) such
that, for any bt−i, for any fixed strategy bi ∈ K,
T∑
t=1
ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i)−
T∑
t=1
ui(bi, b
t
−i) ≥ −Φ(|K|, T ) · χ,
where bti is the strategy bidder i uses at time t.
Theorem 2.1. Regret minimizing algorithms exist. If, at the end of each round, the player learns
the payoff for all K strategies, Φ(|K|, T ) = O(√T ) can be achieved, and if she learns just the payoff
for her strategy, Φ(|K|, T ) = O(T 23 ) can be achieved.
Note that in large auctions and markets, it is the latter result that seems more applicable.
As shown in [1], if all players play regret minimizing strategies, the resulting outcome observes
the PoA bound obtained via a smoothness argument up to the regret minimization error.
5WLOG, we may assume that t = 1.
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3 Our Results
One issue that deserves some consideration when specifying a large setting, and placing some
inevitable restrictions on the possible settings, is to determine which parameters should remain
bounded as the setting size grows. So as to be able to state asymptotic results, we give results in
terms of a parameter L which is allowed to grow arbitrarily large. 6 But in fact all settings are
finite, so really when stating that some parameters are bounded, we are making statements about
the relative sizes of different parameters.
One common assumption is that the type space is finite. However, it is not clear such an
assumption is desirable in the settings we consider, for it would be asserting that the number of
possible valuations and bidding strategies is much smaller than the number of bidders. Another
standard assumption is that the ratio of the largest to smallest non-zero valuations are bounded.
This, for example, would preclude valuations being distributed according to a power law distribution
(or any other unbounded distribution), which again seems unduly restrictive if it can be avoided.
3.1 Result for Walrasian Auctions
Our analysis makes two assumptions; stronger assumptions were made for the large auction results
in [9, 4]. [9] also ruled out overbidding by arguing it is a dominated strategy. Our analysis can
avoid even this assumption of other players’ rationality; however, bounded overbidding is needed
for the extension to regret minimizing strategies.
Assumption 3.1. [Bounded Expected Valuation] There is a constant ζ such that for each bidder
and each item, her expected value for this single item is at most ζ:
max
s
Evi [vi(s)] ≤ ζ.
Note that without this assumption the social welfare would not be bounded, and then it is not
clear how to measure the Price of Anarchy. Prior work had assumed vi(s) ≤ ζ for all s and i (i.e.
absolutely rather than in expectation).
Theorem 3.1. In a large Walrasian auction which satisfies Assumption 3.1 and with buyers whose
valuation and bid functions are monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes property,
SW(NE) ≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT),
where Y = mL
[
2m
(k+1+m
m
)]
and ρ = SW(OPT)N .
Also, if there is only one good, i.e., if m = 1, then
SW(NE) ≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT),
where Y = 2(k+2)L and ρ =
SW(OPT)
N .
6The only interesting case in these Walrasian auctions is when N = Ω(L), for otherwise, due to bounded demands,
all buyers achieve their optimal allocation w.h.p.
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Remark The gross substitutes assumption is present so as to ensure the auction outcome is
a Walrasian equilibrium w.r.t. to the bids, for if it is not then some bidders will be allocated a
non-favorite bundle, which seems unattractive as a solution concept.
To achieve SW(NE) ≥ (1 − ǫ)SW(OPT) where ǫ is small, we need Lρ·logL to be large. We
can achieve this by considering a sequence of auctions indexed by N , the number of bidders, and
requiring ρ to be a constant and L to be sufficiently large. One way to obtain a constant ρ is to
make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 3.2. [Auction Size] Let µ(nj) be the expected number of copies of good j, for 1 ≤
j ≤ m, and let Γ(nj) be its standard deviation. The assumption is that for each j, µ(nj) = Θ(N)
and Γ(nj) ≤ (1 − λ)µ(nj) for some constant λ > 0. Let α > 0 be such that µ(nj) ≥ αN for all j
and sufficiently large N .
Assumption 3.3. [Value Lower Bound] There is a parameter ρ′ > 0 such that for any bidder, its
largest expected value for one item is at least ρ′:
max
s
Evi [vi(s)] ≥ ρ′.
Lemma 3.1. Let ρ = λ2α 2λ+λ
2
(1+λ)2 ρ
′. If Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 hold, then SW(OPT) ≥ ρN .
In previous work, [4] also made the assumption that ρ is a constant. [9] made assumptions on
the value distribution which again imply ρ is a constant although this consequence is not stated in
his work.
Corollary 3.1. In a large Walrasian auction which satisfies Assumption 3.1 and with buyers
whose valuation and bid functions are monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes property, if the
number of copies of each good is independently and identically distributed according to the Binomial
distribution B(N, 12), and ρ, k,m = O(1), then
SW(NE) ≥
(
1−O
(
logN√
N
))
SW(OPT).
In order to obtain good bounds when using regret minimization algorithms, we need to be able
to bound the possible losses a player makes, which we achieve by bounding the possible overbidding.
This is similar to the notion of overbidding previously given in [8].
Definition 3.1. Let K be the set of strategies a player uses. She is a (γ, δ)-player if v ∈ K and,
for any b ∈ K and for any set x,
b(x) ≤ v(x) · γ + δ.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose all players use regret minimization algorithms, they are all (γ, δ)-players
and their valuation and bid functions are monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes property. Then,
in a large Walrasian auction which satisfies Assumption 3.1,
1
T
En,v,b
[
T∑
t=1
vi(xi(b
t
i, b
t
−i))
]
≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
− maxiΦ(|Ki|, T ) · (kmζγ + δ)
ρ · T
)
SW(OPT).
where Y = mL
[
2m
(k+1+m
m
)]
, ρ = SW(OPT)N , Ki is the set of strategies used by i, and vi ∈ Ki.
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3.2 Fisher Market Results
Theorem 3.3. Let M be a large Fisher market with largeness L in which the utility and bid func-
tions are homogeneous of degree 1, concave, continuous, monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes
property. If its demands as a function of the prices are unique at any p > 0, or if its utility
functions are linear, then its Price of Anarchy and its Geometric Price of Anarchy is bounded by
PoA(M) ≤ em/L,GPoA(M) ≤ em/L,
where m is the number of distinct goods in the market.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no need for uncertainty in this setting. Note that these assump-
tions on the utility functions are satisfied by Cobb-Douglas utilities, and by those CES and Nested
CES utilities that meet the weak gross substitutes condition. We note that our results do not
extend to Fisher markets with Leontief utilities. For Theorem 4 in [21] can be readily adapted to
show that for some Fisher markets with Leontief utility functions, when L is large, the PoA is at
least m, the number of goods.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose all players use regret minimization algorithms, their utility functions and
bid functions are homogeneous of degree 1, concave, continuous, monotone, and satisfy the gross
substitutes property. If its demands as a function of the prices are unique at any p > 0, or if its
utility functions are linear, then in a large Fisher Market with largeness L and with reserve prices
r such that for any j, 1λ ≤
rj
pj(v)
≤ 14 ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
i
ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i) ≥ (e−
2m
L − maxiΦ(|Ki|, T )
T
λ)
∑
i
ui(vi, v−i),
where Ki is the set of strategies used by player i and vi ∈ Ki.
4 Large Walrasian Auctions
Here we prove a slightly weaker version of Theorem 3.1 which demonstrates the main ideas (The-
orem 4.1 below). Our goal is to show that in expectation∑
i
E
[
ui(xi(vi, b−i))
]
≥ SW(OPT)−R−O(Nǫ),
where R denotes the expected auction revenue. For then we can apply the smooth technique for
Bayesian settings [3] to obtain our result.
This follows from two observations. First, with high probability, a buyer has at most a small
influence on prices (Lemma 4.1), and hence can improve her own utility by at most a small amount
via a non-truthful bid (Lemma 4.2). Otherwise, by Assumption 3.1 and the Gross Substitutes prop-
erty, her expected utility is bounded by kmζ. The probability bound stems from the distribution F
over the number of goods. To obtain the bound, we define (k, ǫ)-good and bad multiplicity vectors
n, wr.t. bids b. By counting their number, we will show that the fraction of (k + 1, ǫ)-bad vectors
is O( 1Lǫ). Also, if the vector is (k + 1, ǫ)-good, we will show that a bidder can cause the prices,
when they are all bounded by 1, to vary by at most (k + 1)ǫ. Essentially, a vector n is (k, ǫ)-good
if changing the supplies by at most k items causes prices pj ≤ 1 to change in total by at most kǫ.
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Then, using the fact that the equilibrium is Walrasian, we can show that for (k+1, ǫ)-good vectors
n,
ui(xi(vi, b−i)) ≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− k(k + 1)ǫ.
On summing over i and taking expectations, we can then deduce that∑
i
E
[
ui(xi(vi, b−i))
]
≥ SW(OPT)− R−N · k · (k + 1) · ǫ−O(N · k
Lǫ
).
Recall that the English Walrasian mechanism can be implemented as an ascending auction. The
prices it yields can be computed as follows: pj is the maximum possible increase in the social welfare
when the supply of good j is increased by one unit. Similarly, the Dutch Walrasian mechanism
can be implemented as a descending auction, and the resulting price pj is the loss in social welfare
when the supply of good j is decreased by one unit.
We will be considering an arbitrary Walrasian mechanism. Necessarily, its prices must lie
between those of the Dutch Walrasian and English Walrasian mechanisms. We let pEng(n; (bi, b−i))
denote the price output by the English Walrasian mechanism and pDut(n; (bi, b−i)) be the price
output by the Dutch Walrasian mechanism.
We define the distance between two price vectors p and p′ with respect to U as follows:
distU (p,p′) =
m∑
j=1
∣∣min{pj , U} −min{p′j, U}∣∣ .
Definition 4.1. Given bidding profile (bi, b−i), n = (nj, n−j) is (ǫ, U)-bad for good j if, in the
English Walrasian mechanism, the distance between the prices is more than ǫ when an additional
copy of good j is added to the market:
distU (pEng((nj, n−j); (bi, b−i)),p
Eng((nj + 1, n−j); (bi, b−i))) > ǫ.
Let k = (k, k, . . . , k) and 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) be m-vectors.
Definition 4.2. Given bidding profile b, n is (k, ǫ, U)-bad for good j if there is a vector n′ which
is (ǫ, U)-bad for good j, such that n′h ≤ nh for all h, and
∑
h nh ≤ k +
∑
h n
′
h. n is (k, ǫ, U)-good
if it is not (k, ǫ, U)-bad.
For brevity, we sometimes write ui(vi, b−i) instead of ui(xi(vi, b−i)). For simplicity, let Λ(m,k)
denote m · (k+mm ).
Lemma 4.1. In the English Walrasian mechanism with bidding profile b, the probability that n is
(k, ǫ, U)-bad for some good, or minj nj ≤ k is at most
m
L
[
U
ǫ
Λ(m,k) + k + 1
]
.
Let |xi(·)| denotes the total number of items in allocation xi. Let di  xi(vi, v−i) be a minimal
set with vi(di) = vi(xi(vi, v−i)). By Definition 2.3(i), |di| ≤ k.
Lemma 4.2. If n is (k + 1, ǫ, U)-good, where U ≥ vi(s) for every single item s, nj > k + 1 for all
j, and vi and bi satisfy the gross substitutes property for all i, then
ui(vi, b−i) ≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ,
where the sum is over all the items in allocation xi.
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Theorem 4.1. In a large Walrasian auction which satisfies Assumption 3.1 and with buyers whose
valuation and bid functions are monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes property,
SW(NE) ≥
(
1− 3k · ζ ·m
ρ
√
(k + 2)
m
L
Λ(m,k + 1)
)
SW(OPT),
where ρ = SW(OPT)N .
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, if n is (k + 1, ǫ · maxs{vi(s)},maxs{vi(s)})-good and nj > k + 1 for all j,
then
ui(vi, b−i) ≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ ·max
s
{vi(s)}.
By Lemma 4.1, the probability that n is (k+1, ǫ ·maxs{vi(s)},maxs{vi(s)})-bad or nj ≤ k+1
for some j is less than
m
L
[
1
ǫ
Λ(m,k + 1) + k + 2
]
,
and En[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥ En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ ·max
s
{vi(s)}
]
− m
L
[
1
ǫ
Λ(m,k + 1) + k + 2
]
· k ·max
s
{vi(s)}.
Here, the expectation is taken over the randomness on the multiplicities of the goods; the inequality
holds since ui(vi, b−i) ≥ 0 and vi(xi(vi, v−i)) ≤ k ·maxs{vi(s)}.
Taking the expectation over the valuation of agent i yields
Evi [En[ui(vi, b−i)]] ≥ Evi
[
En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ ·max
s
{vi(s)}
]
−m
L
[
1
ǫ
Λ(m,k + 1) + k + 2
]
· k ·max
s
{vi(s)}
]
≥ Evi
[
En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
]]
−Evi [maxs {vi(s)}] · k · (k + 1)ǫ
−Evi [maxs {vi(s)}]
m
L
[
Λ(m,k + 1)
k
ǫ
+ (k + 2)k
]
.
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Since Evi [maxs{vi(s)}] ≤ Evi [
∑
s vi(s)] ≤
∑
s Evi [vi(s)] ≤ m · ζ,
Evi [En[ui(vi, b−i)]] ≥ Evi
[
En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
]]
−ζ ·m · k(k + 1)ǫ
−ζ ·m ·m · 1
L
[
Λ(m,k + 1)
k
ǫ
+ (k + 2)k
]
.
Let R(b) denote the expected revenue when the bidding profile is b. Also, recall that SW(OPT) =
ρN . Now, summing over all the bidders yields
∑
i
Ev,b,n[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥
∑
i
Ev,b
[
En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
]]
−ζ ·m ·m · 1
L
[
Λ(m,k + 1)
k
ǫ
+ (k + 2)k
]
·N
−ζ ·m · k(k + 1)ǫ ·N
≥
(
1− ζ ·m ·m ·
1
L
[
Λ(m,k + 1)kǫ + (k + 2)k
]
ρ
−ζ ·m · k(k + 1)ǫ
ρ
)
SW(OPT)− Eb[R(bi, b−i)].
Using the smooth technique for Bayesian settings [3] yields
SW(NE) ≥
(
1− ζ ·m ·m ·
1
L
[
Λ(m,k + 1)kǫ + (k + 2)k
]
ρ
−ζ ·m · k(k + 1)ǫ
ρ
)
SW(OPT).
Now set ǫ =
√
m
L
Λ(m,k+1)
k+1 . The claimed bound follows.
Comparison of our methodology with that of [4] We will be considering the combinatorial
auction in [4] which uses separate auctions for each type of good, more specifically a (c+1)-st price
auction when there are c copies of the good. To facilitate a comparison, we adjust their notation
to match the notation we have been using and reduce its generality7. They begin by defining a
notion of smooth in the large which in the current context amounts to showing∑
i
U(vi, b−i) ≥ (1− ǫ)SW(OPT)−R(b). (4.1)
To obtain such bounds, they propose the following methodology: It entails identifying an approxi-
mate utility function U(vi, b−i) and then showing the following two bounds:
• The approximate and actual utilities are close: For all b, |ui(b)− Ui(b)| ≤ ǫ.
7In fact, the comparison applies in full generality.
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• The standard smoothness formulation applies to the approximate utility: For all i,v,b,∑
i U(vi, b−i) ≥ SW(OPT)−R(b).
One can then deduce that
∑
i U(vi, b−i) ≥ SW(OPT)−R(b)−Nǫ, which, on taking expectations,
is exactly the bound we obtain for our auction. With the assumption that SW(OPT) = ρN one
obtains (4.1). However, it not clear that we can specify an approximate utility U as specified in
the framework of [4]. In particular, handling the expected bound on valuations in this framework,
rather than the fixed bound used by Feldman et al., appears challenging.
5 Large Fisher Markets
Theorem 3.3, which states that the PoA of an m-good market of largeness L is at most em/L, will
follow from the next lemma.
Lemma 5.1. For any bidding profile b and any value profile v which are homogeneous of degree
1, concave, continuous, monotone and which satisfy the gross substitutes property,
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(vi, b−i)) ≥
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(vi, v−i))−m ·max
i
ei.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: We proof our results of GPoA and PoA separately.
• PoA bound On exponentiating the expressions on both sides in the statement of Lemma 5.1,
we obtain ∏
i
ui(vi, b−i)
ei ≥ 1
em·maxi ei
∏
i
ui(vi, v−i)
ei .
Therefore,
∏
i
(
ui(vi,b−i)
ui(vi,v−i)
)ei ≥ 1em·maxi ei . Using the weighted GM-AM inequality, we obtain∑
i ei
ui(vi,b−i)
ui(vi,v−i)∑
i ei
≥
(∏
i
(ui(vi, b−i)
ui(vi, v−i)
)ei) 1∑i ei ≥ ( 1
emmaxi ei
) 1∑
i ei
= e
−
mmaxi ei∑
i ei .
Since for all i, ui(vi, v−i) = tei,
∑
i ui(vi, b−i) ≥ e
−
mmaxi ei∑
i ei
∑
i ui(vi, v−i). The theorem follows
on applying the smooth technique.
• GPoA bound According to Lemma 5.1,∏
i
ui(vi, b−i)
ei ≥ 1
em·maxi ei
∏
i
ui(vi, v−i)
ei .
Therefore,∏
i
Eb[ui(vi, b−i)]
ei ≥
∏
i
eEb[logui(vi,b−i)]ei = e
∑
i Eb[logui(vi,b−i)]ei
= eEb[
∑
i log(ui(vi,b−i)
ei )] = eEb[log(
∏
i ui(vi,b−i)
ei )]
≥ eEb[log 1em·maxi ei
∏
i ui(vi,v−i)
ei ] =
1
em·maxi ei
∏
i
ui(vi, v−i)
ei .
By applying the Nash equilibrium condition, Eb[ui(bi, b−i)] ≥ Eb[ui(vi, b−i)], the GPoA bound
follows.
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To prove Lemma 5.1, we need the following claim; intuitively, it states that a single bidder can
cause the prices to decrease by only a small amount.
Lemma 5.2. p(vi, b−i) ≤ p(bi, b−i) + maxi ei · 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.1: Consider the dual of the Eishenberg-Gale convex program:
min
p
max
x
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))−
∑
i,j
pjxij +
∑
j
pj
s.t. ∀j : pj ≥ 0 and ∀i, j : xij ≥ 0.
Let p denote an arbitrary collection of prices, and p∗ denote the prices with truthful bids. Since
p∗ minimizes the dual program,
max
x≥0
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))−
∑
i,j
pjxij +
∑
j
pj (5.1)
≥ max
x≥0
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))−
∑
i,j
p∗jxij +
∑
j
p∗j .
Let x˜ij be an allocation over all goods j and bidders i at prices p that maximize (5.1). As ui is
homogeneous of degree 1, ui is differentiable in the direction xi. It follows that
lim
ǫ→0
[ei · log ui((1 + ǫ)x˜i)−
∑
j pj(1 + ǫ)x˜ij ]− [ei · log ui(x˜i)−
∑
j pjx˜ij]
ǫ
= 0. (5.2)
The LHS of (5.2) equals ei −
∑
j pjx˜ij, implying that ei =
∑
j pj x˜ij. Therefore,
maxx:∀i
∑
xijpj=ei
∑n
i=1 ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · xim)) +
∑
j pj
≥ maxx:∀i∑xijp∗j=ei
∑n
i=1 ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · xim)) +
∑
j p
∗
j . (5.3)
If all the prices stay the same or increase, a buyer’s optimal utility stays the same or reduces.
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Using the price upper bound from Lemma 5.2, it follows that
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(vi, b−i)) ≥
n∑
i=1
max
x:∀i
∑
xij(pj(bi,b−i)+maxi′ ei′)=ei
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))
=
n∑
i=1
max
x:∀i
∑
xij(pj(bi,b−i)+maxi′ ei′)=ei
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))
+
∑
j
(pj(bi, b−i) + max
i′
ei′)−
∑
j
(pj(bi, b−i) + max
i′
ei′)
≥
n∑
i=1
max
x:∀i
∑
xijp∗j=ei
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))
+
∑
j
p∗j −
∑
j
(pj(bi, b−i) + max
i′
ei′) by (5.3)
≥
n∑
i=1
max
x:∀i
∑
j xijp
∗
j
=ei
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · , xim))−mmax
i
ei
as
∑
j
p∗j =
∑
i
ei =
∑
j
pj(bi, b−i)
=
n∑
i=1
ei log(ui(vi, v−i))−mmax
i
ei.
The proof of Lemma 5.2 uses the following notation and follows from Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4
below. p denotes the prices when the ith bidder is not participating and the bidding profile is
b−i; x denotes the resulting allocation. Similarly, pˆ denotes the prices when the bidding profile is
(bi, b−i); xˆ denotes the resulting allocation.
Lemma 5.3. p  pˆ = p(bi, b−i).
Lemma 5.4. pˆ  p+ ei · 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.2: Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 also apply to prices p(vi, b−i) as well as to pˆ. So
p(vi, b−i) ≤ p+ ei · 1 ≤ p(bi, b−i) + ei · 1 ≤ p(bi, b−i) + maxi ei · 1.
Lemma 5.4 follows readily from Lemma 5.3.
Proof of Lemma 5.4: Since 1 · p+ ei = 1 · pˆ and p  pˆ, the lemma follows.
We finish by proving that Lemma 5.3 holds in two scenarios: single-demand WGS utility func-
tions and linear utility functions.
5.1 Single-Demand WGS Utility Functions
Proof of Lemma 5.3: For a contradiction, we suppose there is an item j such that pj > pˆj.
Let ǫ > 0 be a very small constant such that ǫ < pk for all pk 6= 0 and ǫ < pˆk for all pˆk 6= 0.
Let p′ denote the following collection of prices: p′k = pk if pk 6= 0, and p′k = ǫ otherwise. We
consider the resulting demands for a bidder h 6= i. Recall that xh denotes bidder h’s demand at
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prices p. x′h will denote her demand at prices p
′. By the WGS property, x′hk = xhk if pk 6= 0, and
x′hk = 0 if pk = 0, i.e. if p
′
k = ǫ.
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Analogously, let pˆ′k = pˆk if pˆk 6= 0, and pˆ′k = ǫ otherwise. Let xˆh denote bidder h’s demand at
prices pˆ, and xˆ′h her demand at prices pˆ
′. Again, xˆ′hk = xˆhk if pˆk 6= 0, and xˆ′hk = 0 if pˆ′k = ǫ.
Now, we look at those items l which have the smallest ratio between p′l and pˆ
′
l.
S =
{
l
∣∣∣∣∣ pˆ′lp′l = mink pˆ
′
k
p′k
}
.
By assumption, pj > pˆj; therefore p
′
j > pˆ
′
j. Thus, for l ∈ S, pˆ
′
l
p′
l
< 1. For simplicity, let η denote
this ratio. Note that this inequality implies p′l > ǫ, and thus pl = p
′
l > 0. Also,
pl = p
′
l > pˆ
′
l > 0. (5.4)
We now consider the following procedure:
First multiply p′ by η. By the homogeneity of the utility function, bidder h’s demand at prices
η · p′ will be 1ηx′h. Note that η · p′l = pˆ′l for any l ∈ S and η · p′k < pˆ′k for any k /∈ S.
Second, increase the prices of η · p′ to pˆ′. Since for l ∈ S the two prices are the same, by the
Gross Substitutes property, xˆ′hl ≥ 1ηx′hl for any l ∈ S.
Summing over all the bidders except i,∑
h 6=i
xˆ′hl ≥
1
η
∑
h 6=i
x′hl for l ∈ S.
By (5.4), pl > 0 for any l ∈ S; hence
∑
h 6=i x
′
hl =
∑
h 6=i xhl = 1. So, since η < 1,∑
h 6=i
xˆ′hl >
∑
h 6=i
x′hl =
∑
h 6=i
xhl = 1 for l ∈ S. (5.5)
For all h and l, xˆhl ≥ xˆ′hl. Therefore,∑
h
xˆhl ≥
∑
h 6=i
xˆ′hl >
∑
h 6=i
xhl = 1 for l ∈ S.
As
∑
h xˆhl ≤ 1, this is impossible and yields a contradiction.
5.2 Linear Utility function
Proof of Lemma 5.3: For a contradiction, we suppose there is an item j such that pj > pˆj .
Now, we look at those items j which have the smallest ratio between pl and pˆl.
S =
{
l
∣∣∣∣∣ pˆlpl = mink pˆkpk
}
.
For simplicity, we set 0x = 0 for x > 0,
0
0 = 1 and
x
0 = +∞ for x > 0.
For linear utility functions, we use the following observation: if at prices p a bidder’s favorite
items include some items in S, then at prices pˆ her favorite items will all be in S.
Therefore, as the price of each good equals the total spending on that good,∑
l∈S
pl ≤
∑
l∈S
pˆ′l.
This implies that mink
pˆk
pk
= 1, and the lemma follows.
8Changing the prices from p to p′, one by one, by setting p′k to ǫ, which happens when pk = 0, only increases the
demand for other goods, but as no spending is released by this price increase, these demands are in fact unchanged.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Let #itemsj denote the number of copies of good j that are present, and
let Nj denote the number of buyers for which good j has the largest expected value (breaking
ties arbitrarily). By Chebyshev’s Theorem, Pr
[
#itemsj > E[#itemsj] − t · Γ(#itemsj)
] ≥ 1 − 1
t2
.
We set t equal 1 + λ, where λ is the parameter in Assumption 3.2. Then by Assumption 3.2,
Pr
[
#itemsj > λ
2 · E[#itemsj ]
]
≥ 2λ+λ2(1+λ)2 , which implies Pr[#itemsj > λ2αN ] ≥ 2λ+λ
2
(1+λ)2 . If at least
λ2αN copies of good j are available, then by Assumption 3.3, there is an assignment with valuation
at least ρ′ ·min{Nj , λ2αN}. Therefore, the social welfare is at least
∑
j min{Nj , λ2αN} 2λ+λ
2
(1+λ)2
·ρ′ ≥
λ2α 2λ+λ
2
(1+λ)2N · ρ′.
A.2 Proofs from Section 4
In Lemmas A.1 and A.4, we bound the number of (ǫ, U)-bad multiplicity vectors, and then in
Lemma 4.1 we bound the probability of a (k, ǫ, U)-bad vector. Following this, in Lemma A.5
and A.6, assuming the multiplicity vector is (k + 1, ǫ, U)-good, we bound the difference between
the English Walrasian mechanism prices and those of the Walrasian mechanism at hand. Next, in
Lemma 4.2, again for (k+1, ǫ, U)-good multiplicity vectors, we relate ui(xi(vi, b−i)) to vi(xi(vi, v−i))
and the prices paid; we then use this to carry out a PoA analysis.
First, we have following two observations.
Observation A.1. In the Dutch Walrasian mechanism, if there are zero copies of a good, letting
its price be +∞ will not affect the mechanism outcome.
Observation A.2. Suppose bidders’ demands satisfy the Gross Substitutes property. In both the
English and Dutch Walrasian mechanisms, if ni ≥ n′i, then p(ni, n−i)  p(n′i, n−i), where p  p′
means that, for all j, pj ≤ p′j .
Lemma A.1. In the English Walrasian mechanism, given n−j and bidding profile b, the number
of values nj for which (nj, n−j) is (ǫ, U)-bad for good j is at most
m
ǫ U .
Proof of Lemma A.1: We prove the result by contradiction. Accordingly, let
S =
{
nj
∣∣∣∣∣distU (pEng((nj, n−j);b),pEng((nj + 1, n−j);b)) > ǫ
}
and suppose that |S| > mǫ U .
The proof uses a new function pf (·) : pf (nj) =
m∑
q=1
min{pEngq ((nj , n−j);b), U}.
Then, lim inf
n→∞
(pf (0) − pf (n)) = lim inf
n→∞
n−1∑
h=0
(pf (h)− pf (h+ 1))
≥
∑
nj∈S
(pf (nj)− pf (nj + 1)) > m
ǫ
U · ǫ = m · U. (A.1)
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The first inequality follows as by Observation A.2, pf (·) is a non-increasing function. Further, by
construction, 0 ≤ pf (h) ≤ l · U for all h, thus lim infn→∞(pf (0) − pf (n)) ≤ l · U , contradicting
(A.1).
Lemma A.2. (
m+ n− 1
n
)
=
n∑
i=0
(
m+ i− 2
i
)
Lemma A.3.
k∑
n=0
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
=
k∑
n=0
(k − n+ 1)
(
m+ n− 2
n
)
.
Proof.
k∑
n=0
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
=
k∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
(
m+ i− 2
i
)
=
k∑
i=0
k∑
n=i
(
m+ i− 2
i
)
=
k∑
i=0
(k − i+ 1)
(
m+ i− 2
i
)
.
Lemma A.4. In the English Walrasian mechanism with bidding profile b, for a fixed n−j, the
number of values nj for which (nj , n−j) is (k, ǫ, U)-bad for good j is at most
m
ǫ U ·
(k+m
m
)
.
Proof of Lemma A.4: Consider the case that m ≥ 2. For (nj, n−j) to be (k, ǫ, U)-bad for good
j we need an (ǫ, U)-bad vector n′  n for good j, with ∑h 6=j nh − n′h = c for some 0 ≤ c ≤ k and
nj − n′j ≤ k− c. There are
(m−2+c
c
)
ways of choosing the n′−j. For each n
′
−j, by Lemma A.1, there
are at most mǫ U points that are (ǫ, U)-bad for good j. For each (ǫ, U)-bad point, there are k− c+1
choices for nj. This gives a total of
k∑
c=0
m
ǫ
U(k − c+ 1)
(
m− 2 + c
c
)
=
m
ǫ
U
k∑
c=0
(
m− 1 + c
c
)
=
m
ǫ
U
(
m+ k
k
)
(k, ǫ, U)-bad vectors. Note that the first equality follows by Lemma A.3 and the second equality
follows by Lemma A.2.
For the case m = 1, for each (ǫ, U)-bad point for this good, it will cause at most k + 1 points
to be (k, ǫ, U)-bad for this good. This gives a total of
m
ǫ
U(k + 1) =
m
ǫ
U
(
m+ k
k
)
.
(k, ǫ, U)-bad vectors.
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Proof of Lemma 4.1: Conditioned on the bidding profile being b,∑
1≤j≤m
Pr[( n is (k, ǫ, U)-bad for good j) ∪ (nj ≤ k)])
≤
∑
1≤j≤m
Pr[(n is (k, ǫ, U)-bad for good j)] + Pr[(nj ≤ k)]
≤
∑
1≤j≤m
∑
n−j
(
Pr[( n is (k, ǫ, U)-bad for good j)|n−j = n−j ]
+ Pr[(nj ≤ k)|n−j = n−j ]
)
· Pr[n−j = n−j]
≤ mF (N)
[
m
ǫ
U
(
k +m
m
)
+ k + 1
]
(by Lemma A.4).
Let nij(bi, b−i) denote the number of copies of good j that bidder i receives with bidding profile
(bi, b−i) and n
i(bi, b−i) denote the corresponding vector. Also, let p
Eng(n; b−i) denote the market
equilibrium prices when bidder i is not present.
Lemma A.5. pEngj (n; b−i) ≤ pj(n; (bi, b−i)).
Proof of Lemma A.5: Consider the situation with n′ = n− ni(bi, b−i) and suppose that agent
i is not present. Then pj(n; (bi, b−i)) is a market equilibrium.
So ∀j pEngj (n′; b−i) ≤ pj(n; (bi, b−i)).
Since n ≥ n′, ∀j pEngj (n; b−i) ≤ pEngj (n′; b−i).
The lemma follows on combining these two inequalities.
Lemma A.6. If n is (k + 1, ǫ, U)-good for all goods, and nj > k + 1 for all j, then
∀j min{pj(n; (vi, b−i)), U} ≤ min{pj(n; (bi, b−i)), U} + (k + 1)ǫ.
Proof of Lemma A.6: Let di  ni(vi, b−i) be a minimal set with vi(di) = vi(ni(vi, b−i)). By
Definition 2.3(i),
∑
j d
i
j ≤ k. First, if nij(vi, b−i) > dij then pj(n; (vi, b−i)) = 0, as the pricing is
given by a Walrasian Mechanism.
Consider the scenario with n′ copies of goods on offer, where for all j, n′j = nj−dij and suppose
that bidder i is not present; then p(n; (vi, b−i)) is a market equilibrium.
So, pj(n; (vi, b−i)) ≤ pDutj (n′; b−i).
For all j′ 6= j, let n′′j′ = n′j′ and let n′′j = n′j − 1; then pDutj (n′; b−i) ≤ pEngj (n′′; b−i),
and by Lemma A.5, pEngj (n
′′; b−i) ≤ pEngj (n′′; bi, b−i).
As n is (k + 1, ǫ, U)-good for all goods, and as
∑
h nh − n′′h ≤ k + 1, we conclude that
min{pj(n; (vi, b−i)), U} ≤ min{pEngj (n′′; (bi, b−i)), U}
≤ min{pEngj (n; (bi, b−i)), U} + (k + 1)ǫ ≤ min{pj(n; (bi, b−i)), U}+ (k + 1)ǫ. (A.2)
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Proof of Lemma 4.2: As we are using a Walrasian mechanism, for any allocation x′i,
vi(xi(vi, b−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,b−i)
ps(n; (vi, b−i)) ≥ vi(x′i)−
∑
s∈x′
i
ps(n; (vi, b−i)). (A.3)
We let S denote the set of goods whose prices ps(n; (vi, b−i)) are larger than U . Then,
ui(vi, b−i) = vi(xi(vi, b−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,b−i)
ps(n; (vi, b−i))
≥ vi((xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S)−
∑
s∈(xi(vi,v−i)∩di)\S
ps(n; (vi, b−i)) (by (A.3)) (A.4)
Since n is (k + 1, ǫ, U)-good, by Lemma A.6,
min{ps(n; (vi, b−i)), U} ≤ min{ps(n; (bi, b−i)), U} + (k + 1)ǫ.
Therefore, for any s /∈ S, ps(n; (vi, b−i)) ≤ min{ps(n; (bi, b−i)), U} + (k + 1)ǫ
≤ ps(n; (bi, b−i)) + (k + 1)ǫ.
So, vi((xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S)−
∑
s∈(xi(vi,v−i)∩di)\S
ps(n; (vi, b−i))
≥ vi((xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S)−
∑
s∈(xi(vi,v−i)∩di)\S
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
− |(xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S| · (k + 1)ǫ. (A.5)
For any s ∈ S, on applying Lemma A.6, we obtain U = min{ps(n; (vi, b−i)), U} ≤ min{ps(n; (bi, b−i)), U}+
(k + 1)ǫ, which implies ps(n; (bi, b−i)) + (k + 1)ǫ ≥ U . Also,
vi(xi(vi, v−i)∩di)− vi((xi(vi, v−i)∩di) \S) ≤ vi((xi(vi, v−i)∩di)∩S) ≤ |(xi(vi, v−i)∩di)∩S| ·U,
where the first inequality follows by the Gross Substitutes assumption, and the second by Gross
Substitutes and because by assumption vi(s) ≤ U for all single items s. Thus,
vi((xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S)−
∑
s∈(xi(vi,v−i)∩di)\S
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− |(xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S| · (k + 1)ǫ
≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di)− |(xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) ∩ S| · U
−
∑
s∈(xi(vi,v−i)∩di)\S
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− |(xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di) \ S| · (k + 1)ǫ
≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di)−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)∩di
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ
≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ.
(A.6)
By (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6),
ui(vi, b−i) ≥ vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))− |xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di| · (k + 1)ǫ.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1: By Lemma 4.1, the probability that n is (k+1, maxs{vi(s)}2c ,maxs{vi(s)})-
bad or nj ≤ k + 1 for some j is less than
m
L
[
1
maxs{vi(s)}
2c
max
s
{vi(s)}Λ(m,k + 1) + k + 2
]
=
m
L
[2cΛ(m,k + 1) + k + 2] .
So, for any integer c′,
En[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥ En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
−
c′∑
c=1
1
[
n is (k + 1,
maxs{vi(s)}
2c
,max
s
{vi(s)})-bad and
(k + 1,
maxs{vi(s)}
2c−1
,max
s
{vi(s)})-good
]
·
∣∣∣xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di∣∣∣ · (k + 1)maxs{vi(s)}
2c−1
− 1
[
n is (k + 1,
maxs{vi(s)}
2c
′−1
,max
s
{vi(s)})-good
]
·
∣∣∣xi(vi, v−i) ∩ di∣∣∣ · (k + 1)maxs{vi(s)}
2c′
]
≥ En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
]
−
c′∑
c=1
m
L
[2cΛ(m,k + 1) + k + 2] · k · (k + 1)maxs{vi(s)}
2c−1
− k · (k + 1)maxs{vi(s)}
2c′
≥ En
[
vi(xi(vi, v−i))−
∑
s∈xi(vi,v−i)
ps(n; (bi, b−i))
− c′ · m
L
[2Λ(m,k + 1) + k + 2] · k · (k + 1) ·max
s
{vi(s)}
− k · (k + 1)maxs{vi(s)}
2c
′
]
.
Summing over all the bidders and integrating w.r.t. v and b gives∑
i
Ev,b,n[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥ SW(OPT)− Eb[R(bi, b−i)]
−N · c′ · m
L
[2Λ(l, k + 1) + k + 2] · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
−N · k · (k + 1) 1
2c′
· ζ ·m.
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Using the smooth technique for Bayesian settings [3] yields
SW(NE) ≥
(
1−
ζ ·m · k · (k + 1) 1
2c′
ρ
−ζ ·m · c
′ · mL [2Λ(m,k + 1) + k + 2] · k · (k + 1)
ρ
)
SW(OPT).
Let Y = mL [2Λ(m,k + 1)]. Set c
′ = ⌈log2 1Y − log2 log2 1Y ⌉; then 12c′ ≤ Y log2
1
Y . So,
SW(NE) ≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT).
B Regret Minimization
B.1 Walrasian Market
We note the following corollary to Theorem 3.1.
Corollary B.1. In a large Walrasian auction which satisfies Assumptions 3.1, if vi and bi are
monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes property for all i, then
∑
i
En,v,b[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT)− Eb[R(bi, b−i)]
where Y = mL
[
2m
(
k+1+m
m
)]
and ρ = SW(OPT)N .
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Since player i uses a regret minimizing algorithm and she is a (γ, δ)-
player,
En
[
T∑
t=1
vi(b
t
i, b
t
−i)
]
≥ En
[
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)− Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (max
xi
vi(xi) · γ + δ)
]
.
Summing over all bidders and integrating w.r.t. v and b gives
En,v,b
[∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i)
]
≥ En,v,b
[∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)−Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (max
xi
vi(xi) · γ + δ)
]
≥ En,v,b
[∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)−Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (kmζγ + δ)
]
.
By Corollary B.1,
∑
i
En,v,b[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT)
−Eb[R(bi, b−i)]. (B.1)
26
Therefore, since valuation equals utility plus payment,
En,v,b
[
1
T
∑
i
T∑
t=1
vi(xi(b
t
i, b
t
−i))
]
= En,v,b
[
1
T
∑
i
T∑
t=1
(ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i) + R(b
t
i, b
t
−i))
]
≥ 1
T
En,v,b
[∑
i
(
T∑
t=1
(ui(vi, b
t
−i) + R(b
t
i, b
t
−i))− Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (kmζγ + δ)
)]
≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT)
− 1
T
∑
i
Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (kmζγ + δ) by (B.1)
≥
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
)
SW(OPT)
−max
i
Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (kmζγ + δ) 1
ρ · T SW(OPT)
=
(
1− 3 · k · (k + 1) · ζ ·m
ρ
· Y · ⌈log2
1
Y
⌉
− maxi Φ(|Ki|, T ) · (kmζγ + δ)
ρ · T
)
SW(OPT).
B.2 Fisher Market with Reserve Prices
Theorem 3.4 will follow from the following lemma; its proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem B.1. For any bidding profile b and any value profile v which are homogeneous of degree
1, concave, continuous, monotone and gross substitutes, if the reserve prices rj ≤ 14p∗j for any j,
then ∑
i
ui(vi, b−i)) ≥ e−
2m
5L
∑
i
ui(xi(p
∗)).
Proof of Theorem 3.4: Since player i uses a regret minimizing algorithm and the maximal
payoff is λui(vi, v−i),
T∑
t=1
ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i) ≥
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)− Φ(|Ki|, T ) · λui(vi, v−i).
Summing over all the bidders gives∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i) ≥
∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)−
∑
i
Φ(|Ki|, T ) · λui(vi, v−i)
≥
∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)−
∑
i
max
i′
Φ(|Ki′ |, T ) · λui(vi, v−i).
27
By Theorem B.1, ∑
i
ui(vi, b−i)) ≥ e−
2m
L
∑
i
ui(xi(p
∗)).
Therefore,
∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i) ≥
∑
i
T∑
t=1
ui(vi, b
t
−i)−
∑
i
max
i′
Φ(|Ki′ |, T ) · λui(vi, v−i)
≥ T · e− 2mL
∑
i
ui(xi(p
∗))−max
i′
Φ(|Ki′ |, T )λ
∑
i
ui(vi, v−i).
The theorem follows on dividing both sides by T .
C Reserve prices
Definition C.1. Eisenberg Gale markets with reserve prices are exactly the solutions to the fol-
lowing convex program:
max
x
n∑
i=1
ei · log(ui(xi1, xi2, · · · xim)) +
m∑
j=1
yjrj
s.t. ∀j :
∑
i
xij + yj ≤ 1
∀i, j : xij ≥ 0,
where rj is the reserve price of item j.
The proof of Theorem B.1 uses the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. For any bidding profile b and any value profile v which are homogeneous of degree
1, concave, continuous, monotone and satisfy the gross substitutes property, if the reserve prices
rj ≤ 14p∗j for any j, then∑
i
ei log ui(vi, b−i))−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗)) ≥ −2m ·max
i′
ei′ .
Proof of Theorem B.1: On exponentiating the expressions on both sides in the statement of
Lemma C.1 we obtain ∏
i
ui(vi, b−i)
ei ≥ 1
e2m·maxi ei
∏
i
ui(vi, v−i)
ei .
Therefore, ∏
i
(ui(vi, b−i)
ui(vi, v−i)
)ei ≥ 1
e2m·maxi ei
.
Using the weighted GM-AM inequality, we obtain∑
i ei
ui(vi,b−i)
ui(vi,v−i)∑
i ei
≥
(∏
i
(ui(vi, b−i)
ui(vi, v−i)
)ei) 1∑i ei ≥ ( 1
e2mmaxi ei
) 1∑
i ei
= e
−
2mmaxi ei∑
i ei .
28
Since ui(vi, v−i) = tei, for all i,∑
i
ui(vi, b−i) ≥ e−
2mmaxi ei∑
i ei
∑
i
ui(vi, v−i).
Our goal is to bound
∑
i ei log ui(vi, v−i) −
∑
i ei log ui(vi, b−i). We will be working with the
following function, the demand at prices p:
x(p) = (x1(p), x2(p), · · · ) = argmax
x
∑
i
ei log ui(xi) + 1 · p−
∑
i
xi · p. (C.1)
Recall that, by Lemma 5.2, pj(vi, b−i) ≤ pj(bi, b−i) + 1 · ei. Consequently, ui(xi(p(vi, b−i))) ≥
ui(xi(p(b) + 1 ·maxi′ ei′)), and so it will suffice to bound
∑
i eiui(vi, v−i))−
∑
i eiui(xi(p(b) + 1 ·
maxi′ ei′)).
We want to apply the bound in (5.3), but then we need prices q such that
∑
j qj =
∑
i ei.
Accordingly, we will be considering the scaled prices q(b) = (p(b) + 1 ·maxi′ ei′) ·
∑
i xi∑
j pj(b)+maxi′ ei′
and the compressed prices, defined below.
For convenience, in the following definition, we set 0x = 0 for x > 0,
0
0 = 1 and
x
0 = +∞ for
x > 0.
Definition C.2. Let q be a price vector such that 1 · q =∑i ei. The l-compressed version (l ≤ 1)
of q is defined as p′j(l,q) where
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= l if
qj
p∗j
≤ l,
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= t if
qj
p∗j
≥ t,
and
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
=
qj
p∗j
if l <
qj
p∗j
< t,
where t is a number bigger than 1 such that
∑
j p
′
j(l,q) =
∑
i ei, and p
∗ is the optimal solution
(1 · p∗ =∑i ei).
Henceforth, unless noted otherwise, we let p denote p(b) and q denote q(b).
Lemma C.2.
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′)) =
∑
i
ei log ui
(
xi(p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′) ·
∑
i ei∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)
)
−
∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
=
∑
i
ei log ui(q)−
∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
.
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Proof.∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′)) =
∑
i
ei log
[
ui(xi(p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′)
·
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
·
∑
i ei∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)
)
]
=
∑
i
ei log
[
ui(xi((p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′)
·
∑
i ei∑
j pj +maxi′ ei′
)) ·
∑
j ei∑
j pj +maxi′ ei′
]
.
Now∑
i
ei log
[
ui(xi((p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′) ·
∑
i ei∑
j pj +maxi′ ei′
)) ·
∑
j ei∑
j pj +maxi′ ei′
]
=
∑
i
ei log ui(xi((p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′) ·
∑
i ei∑
j pj +maxi′ ei′
))−
∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
.
Lemma C.3. Suppose that
∑
j qj =
∑
j p
′
j =
∑
i ei. Then∑
i
ei log ui(xi(q)) −
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
′)) ≥
∑
ij
(p′j − qj)xij(p′).
Proof. As x(q) = argmaxx
∑
i ei log ui(xi)−
∑
i xi · q+ 1 · q,∑
i
ei log ui(xi(q))−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
′))
≥
∑
i
q · xi(q)−
∑
i
q · xi(p′).
As in the “PoA” analysis, xi(q) = argmaxxi·q=ei ui(xi). So,xi(q) · q = ei and xi(p′) · p′ = ei.
Therefore, ∑
i
q · xi(q)−
∑
i
q · xi(p′)
=
∑
i
q · xi(q)−
∑
i
q · xi(p′) +
∑
i
p′ · xi(p′)−
∑
i
p′ · xi(p′)
=
∑
ij
(p′j − qj)xij(p′).
Lemma C.4. There exists an x(p′), where p′ = p′j(l,q), such that, for any l < 1, if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= l,∑
i xij(p
′) ≥ 1l and if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= t,
∑
i xij(p
′) ≤ 1t .
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Proof. It is straightforward to check this for linear utility functions.
Now we consider the single-demand WGS utility functions. Let p̂ denote the prices such that
p̂j = pj when pj > 0 and p̂j = ǫ when pj = 0. Note that here ǫ is an arbitrarily small positive
value.
By the homogeneity of the utility function, there exists an x(lp∗), such that
∑
i xij(lp
∗) = 1l
for all j such that p∗j > 0. Now, we consider
∑
i xij(l̂p
∗). For those j such that p∗j > 0, by the
Gross Substitutes property,
∑
i xij(l̂p
∗) ≥ 1l .
Then, we let the price increase from l̂p∗ to p̂′j(l,q). Also, by Gross Substitutes property,∑
i xij(p̂
′
j(l,q)) ≥ 1l for those j such that p∗j > 0 and
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= l. By the same reasoning,∑
i xij(p̂
′
j(l,q)) ≤ 1t for those j such that p∗j > 0 and
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= t.
Furthermore, by the Gross Substitutes property and homogeneity of the utility function,
∑
i xij(p̂
′
j(l,q)) =
0 for those j such that p∗j = 0.
9
So, there exists an x(p̂′), where p′ = p′j(l,q), such that for p
∗
j > 0, if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= l,
∑
i xij(p̂
′) ≥ 1l
and if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= t,
∑
i xij(p̂
′) ≤ 1t , and for p∗j = 0,
∑
i xij(p̂
′) = 0.
Since l < 1,
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
6= l when p∗j = 0. Therefore, we have an x(p̂′), where p′ = p′j(l,q), such that
if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= l,
∑
i xij(p̂
′) ≥ 1l and if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= t,
∑
i xij(p̂
′) ≤ 1t .
By the Gross Substitutes property, the demand xi(p̂′) for a given ǫ is also an optimal demand
for any 0 < ǫ′ < ǫ. This is because for any small positive ǫ, the demand for those goods with price
ǫ is 0. For reducing prices on those price ǫ goods only reduces the demand for other goods, but as
there can be no reduction in spending on the latter goods, in fact the demands are unchanged.
Therefore, by the continuity and homogeneity of the utility function, there exists an optimal
allocation x(p′), which equals x(p̂′), where p′ = p′j(l,q). For if not, suppose there were a higher
utility allocation when ǫ = 0, whose value is u0, where u0 > ui(xi(p̂′)). Then at any ǫ > 0, we
could achieve utility (1 − λ(ǫ))u0, where limǫ→0 λ(ǫ) = 0, and as xij(p̂′) is an optimal allocation,
ui(xi(p̂′)) ≥ (1 − λ(ǫ))u0. But this holds for every ǫ > 0, so letting ǫ → 0 yields ui(xi(p̂′)) ≥ u0
and hence x(p̂′) is an optimal allocation when ǫ = 0.
Lemma C.5. Suppose that
∑
j qj =
∑
i ei. Then∑
i
ei log ui(xi(q)) −
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
′(l,q))) ≥
∑
i
(
1
l
− 1
)
(lp∗j − qj) · 1qj≤lp∗j .
Proof. By Lemma C.4, There exists an x(p′), where p′ = p′j(l,q), such that if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= l,
9We consider a procedure that changes prices from p∗ to p̂′j(l,q). First, we define prices p
∗
′
such that
̂p′
j
(l,q)
p∗
′
j
= k
and p∗
′
j > 0 if p
∗
j = 0, and
̂p′
j
(l,q)
p∗
′
j
≤ k and p∗
′
j = p
∗
j if p
∗
j > 0. Here, k is a positive constant and k is not infinity.
We increase the prices from p∗ to p∗
′
, by the Gross Substitutes property,
∑
i
xij(p
∗
′
) = 0 for those j such that
p∗j = 0. Then, by homogeneity of the utility function, also for those j,
∑
i
xij(kp
∗
′
) = 0 . Now, we reduce the prices
from kp∗
′
to p̂′j(l,q) (kp
∗
′
is no less than p̂′j(l,q) by the definition of p
∗
′
). Since p̂′j(l,q) = kp
∗
′
j for those j such
that p∗j = 0, by Gross Substitutes property, for those j,
∑
i
xij(p̂′(l,q)) ≤
∑
i
xij(kp
∗
′
). By previous argument that
∑
i
xij(kp
∗
′
) = 0 for those j,
∑
i
xij(p̂′(l,q)) = 0 also holds for those j.
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∑
i xij(p
′) ≥ 1l and if
p′j(l,q)
p∗j
= t,
∑
i xij(p
′) ≤ 1t . Therefore, by lemma C.3,∑
i
ei log ui(xi(q))−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
′(l,q)))
≥
∑
ij
(p′j(l,q)− qj)xij(p′(l,q))
≥
∑
j
(p′j(l,q)− qj) · 1 qj
p∗
j
≤l
· 1
l
+
∑
j
(p′j(l,q)− qj) · 1 qj
p∗
j
≥t
· 1
t
.
Since
∑
j p
′
j(l,q) =
∑
i ei =
∑
j qj , and as qj = p
′
j(l,q) when l <
qj
p∗j
< t,
∑
j
(p′j(l,q) − qj) · 1 qj
p∗
j
≤l
= −
∑
j
(p′j(l,q)− qj) · 1 qj
p∗
j
≥t
.
Thus∑
i
ei log ui(xi(q))−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
′(l,q))) ≥
∑
j
(
1
l
− 1
t
)(p′j(l,q) − qj) · 1 qj
p∗
j
≤l
≥
∑
j
(
1
l
− 1)(lp∗j − qj) · 1qj≤lp∗j .
Lemma C.6.
∑
i ei log ui(xi(p
′(l,q))) ≥∑i ei log ui(xi(p∗).
Proof. The result follows from (5.3), as
∑
j p
∗
j =
∑
i ei =
∑
j p
′
j.
The proof of the next Corollary uses Lemma 5.2, which depends on Lemma 5.3, whose proof, for
single-demand utility functions, changes slightly in the presence of reserve prices, as we comment
on next.
Revised Proof of Lemma 5.3. There are two changes. First, when l ∈ S, we can conclude
that pl = p
′
l > max{0, rl} (in the line preceding (5.4)). Second, when pl > max{0, rl},
∑
h 6=i x
′
hl =∑
h 6=i xhl = 1 (in the line preceding (5.5)). These are the only changes.
Corollary C.1.∑
i
ei log ui(vi, b−i)−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗))
≥
∑
j
(1− l)p∗j −
(
1
l
− 1
)
(pj +max
i′
ei′)
∑
i ei∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)
· 1
(pj+maxi′ ei′ )
∑
i ei∑
j(pj+maxi′
e
i′
)
≤lp∗j
−
∑
i
ei
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
.
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Proof.∑
i
ei log ui(vi, b−i)−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗))
≥
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p+ 1 ·max
i′
ei′))−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗))
≥
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(q))−
∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗)) (by Lemma C.2)
≥
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
′(l,q))) +
∑
i
(
1
l
− 1
)
(lp∗j − qj) · 1qj≤lp∗j
−
∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗)) (by Lemma C.5)
≥
∑
i
(
1
l
− 1
)
(lp∗j − qj) · 1qj≤lp∗j −
∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
(by Lemma C.6).
Let δ =
∑
j(pj + maxi′ ei′) −
∑
i ei. Suppose that the good j reserve price rj ≤ 14p∗j for all j.
Note that
∑
i ei +
∑
j rj · 1pj=rj ≥
∑
j pj ≥
∑
i ei. Clearly,
∑
j rj · 1pj=rj ≥ δ −m ·maxi′ ei′ .
Lemma C.7. ∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
≤ δ.
Proof. ∑
i
ei log
∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)∑
i ei
=
∑
i
ei log(1 +
δ∑
i ei
) ≤
∑
i
ei
δ∑
i ei
= δ.
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Proof of Lemma C.1: We set l = 12 . Then by Corollary C.1 and Lemma C.7,∑
i
ei log ui(vi, b−i))−
∑
i
ei log ui(xi(p
∗))
≥
∑
j
(2− 1)(1
2
p∗j − (pj +max
i′
ei′) ·
∑
i ei∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)
)
· 1
(pj+maxi′ ei′)·
∑
i ei∑
j (pj+maxi′
e
i′
)
≥ 1
2
p∗j
− δ
≥
∑
j
(2− 1)(1
2
p∗j − (rj +max
i′
ei′) ·
∑
i ei∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)
)
· 1
pj=rj∧(rj+maxi′ ei′)·
∑
i ei∑
j(pj+maxi′
e
i′
)
≤ 1
2
p∗j
− δ
≥
∑
j
(
1
2
p∗j − (rj +max
i′
ei′) ·
∑
i ei∑
j(pj +maxi′ ei′)
) · 1pj=rj∧(rj+maxi′ ei′ )≤ 12p∗j − δ
(as
∑
i ei∑
j(pj+maxi′ ei′)
≤ 1)
≥
∑
j
(
1
2
p∗j − (rj +max
i′
ei′)) · 1pj=rj∧(rj+maxi′ ei′)≤ 12p∗j − δ (as
∑
i ei∑
j(pj+maxi′ ei′ )
≤ 1)
≥
∑
j
(
1
2
p∗j − (rj +max
i′
ei′)) · 1pj=rj∧rj≤ 12p∗j − δ
≥
∑
j
rj · 1pj=rj −m ·max
i′
ei′ − δ (as 1
2
p∗j ≥ 2rj)
≥ δ −m ·max
i′
ei′ −m ·max
i′
ei′ − δ = −2m ·max
i′
ei′ (as
∑
j
rj · 1pj=rj ≥ δ −m ·max
i′
ei′).
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